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Working Part of a Mineral
Estate as Adverse Possession
of the Whole
By JOE LEE*
TIS ARTICLE is concerned with the acquisition of title by ad-
verse possession to a mineral underlying land where the adverse
working of the mineral is begun after legal severance of the rights
to the mineral from the surface rights in the land.' Our particular
concern will be with the question of whether an adverse possessor
on the separate mineral estate may, by continuous extraction of a
mineral for the limitation period,2 acquire title to a greater por-
tion of a mineral than he has actually worked.
It is axiomatic that title to minerals, coal, oil, gas, etc., lying
beneath the surface of land is capable of being severed from the
title to the surface of the land itself.' Prior to such severance,
minerals in place are deemed to be a part of the land, but after
severance, the surface and the minerals are separate and distinct
estates. Each may be conveyed by deed or pass by inheritance
and each has all the other attributes and incidents peculiar to the
ownership of land.4
* A.B. in Journalism, LL.B., University of Kentucky. Member of Kentucky,
Louisville, Kentucky, and American Bar Associations. Former Law Clerk, Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals. Presently Law Clerk to U.S. District Judge, Eastern Dis-
trict of Kentucky.
1 Where title to all the minerals or more than one mineral has been severed,
the adverse working of a particular mineral will ripen title to that mineral only,
and not to the minerals in general. Kentucky Block Channel Coal Co. v. Sewell,
249 Fed. 840 (6th Cir. 1927). Cf. Hoilman v. Johnson, 164 N.C. 268, 80 S.E.
249 (1913); Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Staley Oil Co., 138 Tex. 198, 158 S.W. 2d 293
(1942).
2 The statutes of limitation applicable in actions for recovery of real property
apply also to actions for the recovery of an interest in minerals. Pond Creek Coal
Co. v. Hatfield, 289 Fed. 626 (6th Cir. 1917).
3 1 Am. Jur. 156 (1936).
4 Ibid.
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In the absence of a severance of the surface rights from the
mineral rights in the land, title to the minerals may be acquired
merely by adverse possession of the surface.
After severance, however, title to a mineral cannot be acquired
by adverse possession of the surface alone.' Title to a legally
severed mineral can be acquired only by a penetration of the
mineral estate and an adverse working of the mineral itself.
7
Of course, the adverse working of a mineral may continue for
the limitation period, at which time the major portion of the
mineral may remain to be extracted. In such event, may the
ripened title of the intruder extend beyond his operations, or has
he acquired title merely to the mineral actually removed?
It has been suggested in a number of decisions that an intruder
on a mineral estate cannot gain title to any portion of a mineral
not extracted,8 even though he has worked a well-defined mineral
estate under color of title.9 Diederich v. Ware,10 a recent Ken-
tucky case holding otherwise, may be of potentially great im-
portance in the development of mineral law.
In the Diederich case,' Gray and Mellon had obtained a fee
in the oil beneath an 800-acre area by a deed executed and re-
corded in 1859, and had subsequently conveyed the oil rights to
the Gray-Mellon Oil Company, which eventually became defunct.
Plaintiff, who had purchased the rights of an heir of Gray,
claimed an undivided interest in fee in the oil. He sought a
declaration of his rights to royalties from two producing wells
on defendant's 56-acre tract, which was situated within the 800
acres. Perhaps due to a gap in title between one of the grantors
of the oil rights and subsequent owners of his portion of the 800
acres, the deed of the defendant, and likewise those of his prede-
cessors, contained no exception of the oil. In 1923 a predecessor
5 J. B. Gathright Land Co. v. Begley, 200 Ky. 808, 255 S.W. 887 (1928). See
also 85 A.L.R. 2d 127, 129 (1954).
6 Porter v. Justice, 242 S.W. 2d 868 (Ky. 1951). See also 35 A.L.R. 2d 127,
154 (1954).
7Vorhes v. Dennison, 800 Ky. 427, 189 S.W. 2d 269 (1945). See also 85
A.L.R. 2d 127, 173 (1954).
8 Sanford v. Alabama Power Co., 256 Ala. 280, 54 So. 2d 562 (1951) Piney
Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, 258 Ky. 51, 79 S.W. 2d 394 (1934); White v. Miller, 78
Misc. 428, 139 N.Y.S. 660 (1912); French v. Lansing, 78 Misc. 80, 182 N.Y.S.
523 (1911).
9 Ibid.
10288 S.W. 2d 648 (Ky. 1956).
11 Ibid.
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in interest of the defendant leased exploratory drilling rights to
an oil company, which in 1924 sunk two wells on the tract subse-
quently acquired by the defendant. At the time of trial, these
wells had been operated openly and continuously for 32 years,
the royalties having been paid to defendant's predecessors in title
and to defendant. It was held that the defendant had color of
title to the oil beneath his tract, and that the operation of the two
wells for longer than the required statutory period had perfected
his title, by adverse possession, to the oil beneath the entire 56
acres.
The case lends support to the proposition that an intruder on
a mineral estate may acquire title by adverse possession to unex-
tracted portions of a mineral, at least a fugacious mineral.
I. Are the Rules for Determining Extent of Adverse Possession
of Surface Estates Applicable to Mineral Estates?
Courts which have said that an adverse possessor on a mineral
estate cannot gain title to a greater portion of a mineral than he
has actually removed have generally reasoned that the rules of
constructive possession are inapplicable for determining the ex-
tent of adverse possession of a mineral estate. 2 Succinctly stated,
these rules, as applied to surface estates are as follows.
When a person having color of title to a particular tract of land
enters into and adversely holds part of such tract under the
authority ostensibly given by an instrument of title, his ensuing
possession and eventually consummated right are not limited to
the portion of the tract as to which there has been an entry or
actual possession, but are commensurate with the limits of the
tract to which the instrument purports to give him title.
In cases where the element of color of title is absent, the limits
of adverse possession are fixed by the possessor's conduct in erect-
ing fences and cultivating the surface. 3
Two reasons have been stated in the opinions for rejecting the
applicability of the rules in determining the extent of adverse
possession of a mineral. It is said that below the surface there
are no boundaries for defining the limits of the claim to the
12 See the cases of Sanford v. Alabama Power Co., Piney Oil & Gas Co. v.
Scott, and French v. Lansing, supra note 8.
132 C.J.S. 769 (1936).
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minerals.' 4 It is also said that an intruder on a mineral estate can
have no immediately potential use and occupation of the whole
of the mineral over which the law can by construction extend his
actual possession.'5 These reasons were weighed by Kentucky's
high court in the Diederich case.' 6
To attribute validity to the first reason, the court said, would
ignore the fact that mineral estates are generally described by
metes and bounds marked off on the surface.' 7 As to the second
reason, the court said:
This 'immediacy of use! concept, applicable though it may
be to solid minerals, is not particularly persuasive where a
fugacious mineral is involved. Two geologists testified in
the case at bar that the operation of two oil wells on this
56 acres since 1924 altered the entire subterranean structure
underlying not only this particular tract but the entire 800
acres described in the old mineral deed as well, and caused
movement of gases and other natural forces which ordinarily
move oil to the mouth of a well. Thus, in a sense, the opera-
tors of the two oil wells exercised dominion over all of the
oil under their tract when they withdrew it by means of
their two wells. In the case of a solid mineral such as coal
this is not necessarily true, for title to coal can be defeated
only by acts which actually take the mineral. Piney Oil &
Gas Co. v. Scott, above.18
A possible inference from this language is that the court was
casting doubt on the necessity of satisfying this concept in gen-
eral, rather than finding it was satisfied due to the nature of the
mineral involved.
The court went on to say that it was consistent with good
reason to apply the rules of constructive possession in determin-
ing the extent of adverse possession of mineral estates, especially
in view of the tendency to treat mineral estates and surface
estates alike for most other purposes. 19 Whether the court would
have sustained the applicability of these rules had it been dealing
with a solid mineral is a matter of conjecture, since it impliedly
14 Supra note 12.
25 Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, supra note 8.
16 288 S.W. 2d 648 (Ky. 1956).
17 Id., at 646.
18 Id. at 646, 647.
19 Id. at 647.
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approved its earlier opinion in Piney Oil & Gas Company v.
Scott.20
In the Piney Oil case,2 by a deed recorded December 24,
1859, the fee simple owner of an 800-acre tract conveyed the
minerals under the entire tract to another party. The grantor
continued to reside on the tract until his death in 1881, and his
widow resided there until her death in 1900. On February 26,
1901, three descendants of the grantor executed partition deeds
among themselves, all of which deeds contained clauses of gen-
eral warranty with no exception of the minerals. This was true
of all the divers deeds subsequently executed by them and their
vendees. On August 31, 1931, Piney Oil & Gas Company, having
purchased the mineral interests of the original grantee, filed a
petition in equity against 52 vendees holding general warranty
deeds to portions of the original 800-acre tract. Each of the de-
fendants claimed adverse possession of the minerals under his
particular segment of the original tract. Many of these defendants
had not mined or disturbed the minerals under their properties.
Their claim of adverse possession was held to be untenable. Some
of the other defendants had engaged in desultory coal mining
operations on their land, but the court concluded the mining was
permissive and not adverse and that there was no showing of
continuous and unbroken working of the coal.
In discussing the limits of possible adverse possession of the
coal, the court, in our opinion, was certainly correct in pointing
out that those defendants on whose segments there had been no
mining could in no way benefit from the mining operations con-
ducted on other segments.
But in relation to the tracts on which there had been mining,
the court considered inapplicable to an estate in minerals the rule
that actual possession of part of an estate in surface with claim of
title to the whole is sufficient to constitute adverse possession of
the whole. This is evidenced by the following language from the
opinion:
A disseisor upon the surface may actually build
upon, occupy, and use but a portion of the territory em-
braced within his marked line or color, but he has an im-
20 258 Ky. 51, 79 S.W. 2d 394 (1934).
21 Ibid.
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mediately potential use and occupancy of the remainder of
his claim, and the law by construction extends his actual
occupation over it, but when he gets below the surface and
attempts to take possession of the minerals, he can have no
immediately potential use and occupation of the whole of
the minerals over which the law can by construction extend
his actual possession; therefore, he can have no possession
of the unmined portion. Their [those defendants who had
mined their tracts] possession was never in advance of their
operations, unless they surrounded a block; then they had
possession of that block, but no more. They got no more
than they loosened or around which they had established
a confine. By their operations they may have pushed the
mineral owner back, but they never pushed him off. To
disseise the title holder, they must push him off and keep
him off. See Flinn v. Blakeman, 254 Ky. 416, 71 S.W. 2d
961. They could have no actual possession until they had
potential possession of the coal that had not been dis-
turbed.2 2 (Brackets ours).
Of course, this language is dictum. The court concluded
there had been no showing of continuous working of the coal
underlying any segment sufficient to ripen title by adverse pos-
session. Thus the question of whether during their invasion of
the mineral estate any of the intruders had an "immediately
potential use and occupancy" of coal situated beyond their min-
ing operations was not properly before the court.
Does not "potential immediacy of use", if it is a requisite to the
application of constructive possession to adverse possession of
minerals, also exist during intrusion on a solid mineral? A new
shaft may be sunk rather quickly, or the alternative methods of
open pit or strip mining may be practical.
II. Surface Owner as Trustee of the Legally Severed Minerals
Underlying His Land.
Upon severance of the mineral rights from the surface rights
in land subsequent surface holders are by statutory decree2 3 in
Kentucky trustees of the underlying minerals for the use and
benefit of the mineral owner. Unlike non-surface owners intrud-
22 Id. at 65, 79 S.W. 2d at 400.
23 Ky. Rev. Stat. sec. 381.430. Curtis-Jordan Oil & Gas Co. v. Mullins, 269
Ky. 514, 106 S.W. 2d 979 (1936). See also 35 A.L.R. 2d 127, 165 (1954).
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ing on minerals, the surface owner must repudiate this trust in
order to become an adverse possessor, otherwise his working of
the minerals will be deemed permissive.24 In both the Diede-
rich l and Piney 0i126 cases a question considered was whether
there had been sufficient repudiation of this trust by the surface
holder to start the statute of limitation running.
The court in the Piney Oi2 7 case said that in order for the in-
truding surface holders to have established adverse possession
they would have had to openly disavow and repudiate the trust
and give notice thereof to the mineral owner. It found no evi-
dence that the surface holders had clearly and unmistakably
brought home to the mineral owner by "formal" notice the knowl-
edge that they were claiming the minerals adversely, and there-
fore found their mining to be permissive.
In the Diederich28 case it appeared that the Gray-Mellon Oil
Company, while the oil rights in question were vested in it, had
been a party to a suit in which the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held, that by virtue of the 1859 oil deed the company had ac-
quired a fee in the oil. Testimony in the record of that case, de-
cided in 1925, indicated that oil was then being taken from the
56-acre tract subsequently acquired by the defendant surface
holder. The court considered this testimony actual formal notice
to the mineral owners that there was an adverse working of the
oil. It held that this notice, together with the open and notorious
operation of the two wells since that time, was sufficient repudia-
tion of the trust to cause limitation to run against the mineral
owners.
One Kentucky case 20 contains language to the effect that a
surface holder may start limitation running either by working the
minerals under a claim of right or by openly repudiating the trust
and giving the mineral owner notice thereof. It would seem, how-
ever, that mere repudiation of the trust without any working of
the minerals should not be enough to initiate limitation. That
a surface holder may establish adverse possession of a mineral
2 4 Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, supra note 8.
2 5 Diederich v. Ware, supra note 10.26 Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, supra note 8.
27 Ibid.28 Diederich v. Ware, supra note 10.
29 Crabtree v. Petroleum Exploration, Inc., et al., 282 Ky. 32, 137 S.W. 2d
713 (1940).
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held in trust merely by openly working it for the requisite period,
without formal notification to the mineral owner that the trust is
repudiated, seems doubtful. The statutory trust undoubtedly is
decreed because of the greater likelihood of intrusion by the sur-
face holder than by a non-surface holder. To hold that a surface
owner, like a non-surface owner, may start the statute of limita-
tions running merely by openly working a mineral would prob-
ably defeat the purpose of the trust statute.
III. May a Surface Owner Have Color of Title to Previously
Severed Minerals Underlying his Land?
The usual case of intrusion on a mineral estate involves a
taking of a mineral by the surface owner or his lessee.30 Not in-
frequently the surface owner may have worked the mineral under
a claim of right, relying on his deed which does not except
mineral rights, although such rights have been previously con-
veyed to another party.
A question which naturally arises in such circumstances is
whether the surface owner may be deemed to have color of title
to the mineral he has worked. This is apparently a difficult ques-
tion of law to be decided on the facts of each case.31
The court considered this question in both the Diederich 2
and Piney Oi 3 3 cases. It will be recalled that in each case, al-
though the deed severing the mineral rights had been properly
recorded, the deeds of the surface owners contained no exception
of minerals. In the Diederich- case the court concluded that the
surface owner had color of title to the oil beneath his tract. It
reached this conclusion because of the vagueness of description
employed in the old deed severing the oil rights, the fact that
there was a gap in title between the grantor of the oil rights and
subsequent surface owners, and the many conveyances over the
span of years which had ignored the mineral deed.35 Only the
80 Practically every case cited in conjunction with this article is this type of
case.
31 Black v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 93 Ala. 109, 9 So. 537, 538 (1891)
Diederich v. Ware, supra note 10.
32 Diederich v. Ware, supra note 10.
3 3 Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, supra note 8.
34 Diederich v. Ware, supra note 10.
35 Id. at 647.
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latter factor was present in the Piney OiP6 case, wherein the court
used language indicating it felt the surface owners did not have
color of title to the coal beneath their land, or at least had no
more than "bare" color of title. The court said:
A would-be disseisor who enters under a bare
color of title is no better off than one who enters without
color and marks off a distinct line around what he intends
to occupy. Each, if he acquires any rights, must do so be-
cause of his occupation, claim, and use of the premises for
the statutory period.37
This language indicates a conclusion that the defendant sur-
face owners did not have color of title. Upon such a conclusion,
the court seemingly was correct in saying that if the defendants
could establish adverse possession, their possession would not
extend beyond the face of their mine works. Such a holding
would be consistent with the rule governing intrusion without
color of title on a surface estate where the extent of possession is
determined by fences erected or use of the premises. However,
perhaps due to its uncertainty as to whether or not the surface
owners had color of title, the court reasoned that the rules deter-
mining adverse possession of surface estates were completely
inapplicable to adverse possession of mineral estates. Probably
this reasoning was unnecessary in view of the apparent holding
that the defendants did not have color of title.
IV. Origin of the Law that the Rules Determining the Bounds of
Adverse Possession of Surface Estates are Inapplicable to
Adverse Possession of Mineral Estates.
The dictum rule in the Piney Oil case, 8 to the effect that
working part of a mineral estate is not sufficient to give title by
adverse possession to the mineral underlying the whole, was ap-
parently adopted from Linley on Mines.39 Linley supports his
text to this effect by citing the case of French v. Lansing.0
In that case there was a severance between the ownership of
8 Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, supra note 8.
87 Id. at 65 79 S.W. 2d at 400.
38 Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, supra note 8.
89 Linley on Mines, see. 812 (3rd ed. 1914).
40 French v. Lansing, supra note 8.
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the soil and of the minerals. The owner of the surface removed
gypsum from time to time from quarries on his 25 acres and from
other portions of the original 200-acre tract to which the mineral
rights had been reserved. It was held that the mere opening and
working of a quarry by the surface owner did not constitute ad-
verse possession, as against the mineral owners, of the gypsum
situated beyond the face of the quarry. The surface owner's deed
purported to give him the right to dig and carry away gypsum.
But the court pointed out that this right was dependent upon
ownership of the gypsum. Since the title to the gypsum was in
another, the surface owner's grantor could not grant him the right
to dig for it. The court did not discuss whether or not the surface
owner had color of title to the gypsum.
After enumerating what it termed the New York rules of con-
structive possession applicable to surface estates, the court stated
as follows:
These rules apply to adverse possession of the sur-
face, and form no guide, even by analogy, to such a case
as the present. They all contemplate some sort of notice
to the true owner and possession and dominion of one kind
or another over the whole premises claimed adversely.
Where there is such known farm or lot with defined boun-
daries, the partial improvement may fairly be said to give
warning of a claim to the whole, and to constitute possession
of the whole.
The same thing cannot be said to result from the open-
ing of a quarry for gypsum or limestone or the driving of a
gallery into a vein of coal. In either case, what claim is
made or what possession is there of the minerals beyond
the face of the quarry or the end of the vein? If a mine, is
there possession and claim of the entire vein no matter how
far the same may extend? In the case at bar, if there is
adverse possession, it covers at least the 200 acres deeded
to Otis; for it is to be observed that the act of Otis (surface
owner) and his grantees in subsequently dividing the sur-
face is not notice of any kind to Wickham (mineral owner)
and his heirs ... 41
The court could have reached the same result in this case by
determining the surface owner did not have color of title to the
minerals under his tract and then by applying the ordinary rules
41 132 N.Y.S. at 526.
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of constructive possession it had enumerated. If it had deter-
mined the surface owner did have color of title to the minerals,
his adverse possession could not have by construction been ex-
tended beyond the boundaries of his 25-acre surface, since under
his deed he could not possibly have had color of title to the min-
erals beyond his deeded boundaries. The court's fear that under
the ordinary rules of constructive possession, the possession in
this instance might be deemed to extend over the entire mineral
deposit, or in case of a mine, to the end of the vein, was surely
unfounded.
In White v. Miller,4 a later New York case concerning a 12-
acre parcel of the same 200 acres involved in French v. Lansing,41
fuller evidence was given by the surface owner of adverse user of
the gypsum. The surface of the 12 acres, due to quarrying, was
said to be entirely useless for agricultural purposes. But the court
followed the law of the earlier case and held the defendant had
not acquired title to the gypsum he had not removed. The de-
fendant was further ordered to pay damages to the mineral owner
for the gypsum quarried in the six years prior to the commence-
ment of the action.
There are several English cases which may support in some
measure the view taken in White v. Miller" and French v. Lans-
ing,4 and our own Piney Oil case4" as to the nonapplicability of
the rules of constructive possession to mineral estates. These cases
were relied upon as authority for the view taken in those cases.
The English Cases
In M'Donnell v. M'Kinty,4 7 there was a severance of mines,
minerals, and quarries from the surface of land and a lime quarry
was worked by the surface owner who sold some of the lime. It
was held that the user and possession of a part of the quarries by
the surface owner would not justify a legal presumption of the
possession of the whole so as to constitute adverse possession of
the whole. But there the court held the surface owner's deed
4 2 White v. Miller, supra note 8.
43 French v. Lansing, supra note 8.4 4 White v. Miller, supra note 8.
45 French v. Lansing, supra note 8.
46 Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, supra note 8.
47 10Ir. L. 514 (1847).
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specifically excepted the quarries. Thus the surface owner did
not have color of title so the court was probably correct in limiting
his possession. 8
In Glyn v. Howell,49 there had been a severance of the min-
erals from the surface. It appeared that the plaintiff was entitled
to an undivided one-sixth part of the mines under a mountain of
92 acres, and that more than twelve years before the commence-
ment of the action, the defendant, who was the owner of another
undivided one-sixth, extracted all the coal from certain seams
lying under the mountain in a 2-acre patch, having previously
obtained licenses for that purpose from the owner of the remain-
ing four-sixths, but having obtained no license from the plaintiff
in regard to his one-sixth. It was held that the defendant ac-
quired title by adverse possession only to the plaintiff's sixth in
the coal extracted from the 2-acre tract, and he acquired no con-
structive possession of the plaintiffs sixth in the remainder of
the mineral under the mountain, the court stating that where
title is founded on an adverse possession, the title will be limited
to the area of which actual possession has been enjoyed, and that
as a general rule constructive possession of a wider area will only
be inferred from actual possession of the limited area if the infer-
ence of such wider possession is necessary in order to give effect
to contractural obligations, or to preserve the good faith and
honesty of a bargain. The court said such an inference should
not be applied to the defendant's possession in this case because
he was a mere stranger in possession as to the one-sixth part he
did not own.
Thus the court in effect held him to be without color of title
to the one-sixth part he did not own and classified him as a mere
wrongdoer. In this leading English case the court seemed to be
applying the ordinary rules of constructive possession applicable
to surface estates.
48 M'Donnell v. M'Kinty, supra note 47, is very similar to the American case
of Kinder v. LaSalle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 Ill. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923)
wherein a different result was reached. This difference in result may be justified
on the theory that in the Irish case the surface owner's deed specifically excepted
the quarries, while in the Illinois case the deed severing the minerals had been
interpreted by the parties to convey only those minerals which could be mined,
and not to include limestone which outcropped on the surface. Thus in the
Illinois case the surface owner could be considered as having color of title to the
limestone, although the case did not emphasize this point.
491 Ch. 666, 3 B.R.C. 405 (Eng. 1909).
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One English case, Low Moor Co. v. Stanley Coal,50 probably
falls under the rule mentioned in Glyn v. Howell51 to the effect
that title based on adverse possession may not be limited to the
area of actual possession where the inference of possession of a
wider area is necessary to give effect to contractural obligations,
or to preserve the good faith and honesty of a bargain. In that
case it was held that one who enters into actual possession of a
part of a mine, and commences working it under an instrument
by which the owner intended to make him the absolute owner
of the whole mine, but which created in him only a tenancy at
will, has constructive possession of the whole, which, if continued
for the requisite limitation period, will give him an absolute title
to the whole mine, under the statute of limitations.
The English cases of Ashton v. Stock52 and Thompson v. Hick-
man53 are sometimes cited in our American cases as authority for
the view that one taking possession of part of a mineral estate
cannot be deemed to be in constructive possession of the entire
estate so as to allow him to acquire title adversely to the whole
estate. But these cases are not good authority for that view. In
each case an adjoining proprietor, while engaged in working his
coal, had gone on working into the vein and getting out a certain
quantity of his neighbor's coal. It was held in both cases that this
would not in any way give the wrongdoer title to his neighbor's
coal.
It is believed that Earl of Dartmouth v. Spittle54 is this type of
case also. There it was held that the mere working of a portion
of one strata of a mine did not amount to such taking of posses-
sion of the whole mine as to bar the owner's right of entry or
action after the expiration period. But the court also said:
It might be otherwise if the defendant had openly
claimed possession supposing the mine to be his; but here
he may have known he was stealing the coal. I hold that
he acquired no right to the coal fields; his acquisition must
be limited to the coal he took. The case of underground
strata is different from that of surface lands where there
are metes and bounds.55
50 34 L.T.N.S. 186 (Eng. 1875), affirming 33 L.T.N.S. 436 (Eng. 1875).
51 Glyn v. Howell, supra note 49. 526 Ch. D. 719 (Eng. 1877).
Is 1 Ch. 550 (Eng. 1907). 55 Id., 24 L.T.N.S. at 68.
5424 L.T.N.S. 67, 19 Week Rep. 444 (Eng. 1871).
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Although it has been interpreted otherwise,56 the last sentence
of the above quotation probably means that encroachment across
boundary lines is visible on the surface, whereas it may not be
under the ground. 7
These English cases do not categorically support the view that
one working part of a mineral estate cannot be deemed to be in
constructive possession of the whole, well-defined mineral tract,
or that the rules of constructive possession are inapplicable to
mineral estates, except in instances where the mineral is being
taken surreptitiously through an opening located off the estate.
But they have been interpreted as authority for that view by the
American cases relying upon them.
58
The American Cases
There are two American cases, in addition to our Piney Oil
case 59 and the New York cases of French v. Lansing0 and White
v. Miller,61 all previously discussed, which have relied on the Eng-
lish cases as authority for the point that working part of a mineral
estate is not sufficient to give title by adverse possession to the
mineral underlying the whole estate.
In Davis v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia,2 where the
mineral rights in land had been severed from the surface, and a
claim was made to the title to coal by adverse possession but not
by color of title, the court said the law did not extend the force
and effect of the claimant's possession to the outer boundaries of
the claim. It said title founded upon adverse possession of a
mine is limited to that area of which actual possession had been
enjoyed. Glyn v. Howell63 was cited as authority. The dictum
conclusion in this case as to the limits of the adverse possession,
if any, would have been the same even if the ordinary rules of
constructive possession applicable to surface estates had been
56Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, supra note 8.
57 Ky. Rev. Stat., secs. 852.490 and 852.500 are intended to prevent the
surreptitious mining of a neighbor's coal.
68 Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, White v. Miller and French v. Lansing, supra
note 8; Davis v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 219 N.C. 248, 13 S.E. 2d 417
(1941).
59 Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, supra note 8.
60 French v. Lansing, supra note 8.
61 White v. Miller, supra note 8.
62219 N.C. 248, 13 S.E. 2d 417 (1941).
63 Glyn v. Howell, supra note 49.
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applied since there was no evidence of record title or color of title
in plaintiff who was claiming title by adverse possession. There
was really no question of limiting the extent of adverse possession
in that case, however, since the court concluded there had been
merely prospecting for coal so that in actuality title to no part
of that mineral had been acquired adversely.
In Sanford v. Alabama Power Co.,64 there was a severance of
the minerals from the surface of the land and the respondent sur-
face owner had conducted coal mining operations on the land,
but only for two years prior to the commencement of the action.
The respondent's deeds purported to convey him the minerals
under his land, despite the prior severance of the minerals. The
court said that, "Irrespective of the fact that the grantors in such
deeds had no title to the minerals, the deeds would give color of
title."615 (Italic ours.) The respondent invoked "the principle
often declared in the cases where surface rights are involved, to
the effect that actual possession of part of a tract of land, with a
claim of title to the whole, under a written instrument, is sufficient
to constitute possession of the whole tract defined in the convey-
ance to the extent that the same is not in possession of another."66
The court held this principle inapplicable to mining operations,
quoting French v. Lansing67 and our Piney Oil case. 68
The court admitted it was indulging in dictum on the question
of the respondent surface owner's adverse possession of any min-
eral under his land. Respondent had conducted his mining opera-
tions for only two years, a period less than that required by the
statute to ripen title by adverse possession.69
The court felt, however, that the extent of respondents con-
structive possession of the minerals during the period of his min-
ing operations was a problem that had to be resolved before it
could determine whether or not the claimant was entitled to file
his bill to quiet title. The court apparently was harrassed by the
thought that if it held respondent's possession of the coal to be
by construction coextensive with his surface ownership, the
claimant would be out of court, since under Alabama law in order
64 Sanford v. Alabama Power Co., supra note 8.
65 Id., 54 So. 2d at 570. 66 Ibid.
67 French v. Lansing, supra note 8.
08 Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, supra note 8.
69 Code of Alabama (1940), Title 7, sec. 828.
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to file a bill in equity to quiet title, the claimant must have the
quiet and peaceable possession, actual or constructive, of the
mineral or land to which a quieted title is sought.70 The claimant
was relying upon the constructive possession which the law at-
taches to legal title in the absence of actual possession by anyone
else. The respondent was relying on his constructive possession
of the coal under his tract by reason of his having taken actual
possession of part of the coal under color of title. The court held
the respondent was not in constructive possession of all of that
mineral under his land since the laws of constructive possession
did not apply to mineral estates and that therefore the claimant
could maintain the suit to quiet title. The question before the
Alabama court was somewhat peculiar to that jurisdiction since
ordinarily in order to maintain an action to quiet title the claim-
ant must have legal title to the property in question and be in
possession thereof at the time of institution of the action. 71 The
reason for such requirement as to possession is that the legal
remedy of ejectment is ordinarily available to one out of pos-
* 72session.
V. Several U. S. Cases are Authority for the View that the Rules
of Constructive Possession are Applicable to Mineral Estates.
In a few cases in the United States, courts have apparently
taken the view that the rules of constructive possession applicable
to surface estates apply also to mineral estates or have concluded
that working a mineral on part of the property may be sufficient
to give title by adverse possession to all of the mineral underlying
or outcropping on the whole property.
In Kinder v. LaSalle County Carbon Coal Co.,73 it appeared
that the owners of the surface had taken sand, gravel, and lime-
stone from parts of the land suiting their convenience. Title to
the minerals had been severed but the court held the severance
did not include the limestone because a fair interpretation of the
mineral deed indicated that only those minerals which could be
mined were to be conveyed and the only mineral being mined on
70 Id., Title 7, sec. 1109.
7144 Am. Jur. (1942); Ky. Rev. Stat., sec. 411.120; Leach v. Taylor, 206
Ky. 28, 266 S.W. 894 (1924).
7244 Am. Jur. (1942). 73310 Ill. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923).
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the land at the time was coal. The court felt the limestone was
not included because it outcropped on the surface at various
places and could not be removed without destroying the surface.
However, to get at the question of adverse possession of the lime-
stone by the surface owners, the court assumed for purposes of
argument that title to the limestone had also been severed. The
surface owners had over a period of twenty years removed large
quantities of sand, gravel and limestone and even sold some of it
to the mineral owners to use in their coal mining operations. The
court, in holding that the owners of the surface had acquired
title to the limestone by adverse possession, said:
These acts were open, notorious, and hostile to ap-
pellants and their predecessors. It was impossible for ap-
pellees to literally take possession and quarry the limestone
on the entire 185 acres at one time. They did take actual
possession of it at different places on the land, quarried,
hauled it off and sold it, and continued to do so for a period
of 20 years, of which appellants had actual notice. By their
acts appellees evidenced their claim of right to the lime-
stone at any and every place found in the entire tract. They
were such acts of dominion over the limestone as were
notice to persons in the neighborhood that they claimed
exclusive use and control of the limestone and were suf-
ficient to constitute adverse possession of it.74
The court reached this result even though it assumed the surface
owners "had no record title or color of title to the limestone."
However, it appears that the surface owners may have had color
of title to the limestone since there was some question as to
whether title to it had been severed.
75
Where mineral rights in 375 acres of land had been reserved
and separated from the surface by the plaintiff's predecessor in
title, but a deed conveyed the land to the plaintiff by definite
boundaries, in fee simple, without reservation, and the plaintiff
claimed title to the coal under 807 acres of land by adverse pos-
session under color of title, it was held in Vance v. Guy,70 that evi-
dence tending to show continuous operation by the plaintiff of
three or four mines or openings of comparatively small area on
74 141 N.E. at 542.
75 141 N.E. at 541. See supra note 48.
70 223 N.C. 409, 27 S.E. 2d 117 (1948).
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the entire tract was sufficient to take the case to the jury, the court
stating that where one enters into possession of land under a
colorable title which describes the land by definite lines and
boundaries, and occupies and holds adversely a portion of the
land within the bounds of his deed, by construction of law his
possession is extended to the outer bounds of his deed, and pos-
session so held adversely for seven years ripens his title to all the
land embraced in his deed which is not actually occupied by
another. The court further held that the trial court erred in in-
structing the jury that the application of the rules of constructive
possession to the mining of a portion of the land would depend
upon the size of the operation even though it were just in one
part. In a later appea17 the court stated that it was generally
held that where one enters upon real estate under adverse deed
or title, possession so taken will be construed to extend to the
boundaries of the deed or title, and although the deed or title
may turn out to be defective or void, yet the true owner will be
deemed disseised to the extent of the boundaries of such deed or
title, unless at the same time the true owner is in possession of a
part of the estate, claiming title to the whole, in which event his
seisin will extend by operation of law to all not in the actual close
or occupancy of the party entering and claiming under a defective
deed or title.
There are two late cases which, without even discussing the
point, have held that working part of a mineral is sufficient to
give title by adverse possession to the mineral underlying the
whole property.
In Pollard v. Simpson et al.,78 where there had been a sever-
ance of the mineral from the surface estate and the surface owners
had mined coal adversely for the limitation period, it was held
that they acquired title by adverse possession to the coal under-
lying their whole property. It is believed that about 80 acres of
property was involved in that case. This 1941 Alabama case is
contra to Sanford v. Alabama Power Co., discussed above,70
wherein that court stated that its research disclosed no case
where it had been called upon to pass on the question as
77 224 N.C. 607, 81 S.E. 2d 766 (1944).
78 240 Ala. 401, 199 So. 560 (1941).
79 Sanford v. Alabama Power Co., supra note 64.
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to whether the principle that actual possession of part of a tract
of land, with claim of title to the whole, under a written instru-
ment, is sufficient to constitute possession of the whole tract
defined in the conveyance, has application to mining operations.
To be sure the court did not discuss this principle in the Simpson
case,80 but the application of this principle to a mineral estate was
implicit in the court's holding. The surface owners held under
deeds which purported to convey the minerals.
In Medusa Portland Cement Co. v. Lamantina,8' a corporation
which had purchased coal lands from its predecessor corporation
refused to pay the balance due on the purchase price, claiming
there were defects in title to the coal underlying part of the tract.
The court held that even though there were defects in title to
part of the underlying coal when the predecessor corporation
purchased the tract, these defects had been cured by the adverse
working of the coal for the limitation period so that the predeces-
sor corporation had acquired title to the coal by adverse posses-
sion and could now pass good title.
VI. Stratification of Minerals and Adverse Possession.
The English cases of Ashton v. Stock8 2 and Earl of Dartmouth
v. Spittle83 contain language suggesting that the adverse working
of one strata or vein of a mineral would not constitute adverse
possession of another strata of the mineral situated at a different
level beneath the surface. The American cases which have
awarded an intruder the rights to a mineral by virtue of adverse
possession have not considered the question of stratification of
the mineral in their holdings.8 4 Stratification of a mineral prob-
ably has no bearing on the acquisition of title to the mineral by
adverse possession.
Summary and Conclusions
The reasons assigned by the courts for holding the rules of
constructive possession inapplicable in determining the extent
8o Pollard v. Simpson, supra note 78.
81353 Pa. 53, 44 A. 2d 244 (1945).82 Ashton v. Stock, supra note 52.
8 3 Earl of Dartmouth v. Spittle, supra note 54.
84 Pollard v. Simpson, supra note 78; Diederich v. Ware, supra note 10;
Medusa Portland Cement Co. v. Lamantina, supra note 81.
1957]
KE KY LAW J 'ONAL
of adverse possession are not entirely convincing.85 Only three
American cases have actually so held.8 6 Other cases contain dicta
to this effect.8 7 The English cases cited as authority in the Ameri-
can cases do not entirely support the premise of nonapplica-
bility s
There are a number of decisions by high courts of the several
states which support the view that the rule of possession extend-
ing by construction of law to a claimed boundary is applicable in
determining the extent of adverse possession of minerals8 9 It is
submitted that these cases are better reasoned. It is inconsistent
to say that there can be an adverse possession of minerals and
at the same time reject one of the traditional tenets of the
doctrine.90
In each instance of intrusion on a mineral estate where the
requisites for adverse possession have been satisfied, the court
should decide as a matter of law whether or not the intruder has
color of title, and then fix the bounds of his possession by that
determination, applying the rules for determining extent of ad-
verse possession of surface estates.
If the intruder is the surface owner, the fact that he is con-
sidered a trustee of the separate mineral estate beneath his land,91
and probably must give actual notice of his adverse claim in order
to repudiate the trust and start the statute of limitation running,
9 2
affords a great deal of protection to the mineral owner.
The taking of a mineral from one level is probably sufficient
manifestation of an adverse claim to that mineral at all levels.
85 Diederich v. Ware, supra note 10.
86 Sanford v. Alabama Power Co., White v. Miller and French v. Lansing,
supra note 8.87 Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, supra note 8; Davis v. Federal Land Bank
of Columbia, supra note 62.
8s Glyn v. Howell, supra note 49; Thompson v. Hickman, supra note 53;
Ashton v. Stock, supra note 52; Earl of Dartmouth v. Spittle, supra note 54.
Pollard v. Simpson, supra note 78; Kinder v. LaSalle County Carbon Coal
Co., supra note 73; Vance v. Guy, supra notes 76 and 77; Medusa Portland
Cement Co. v. Lamantina, supra note 81; Diederich v. Ware, supra note 10.
90 32 New York University Law Review, 621, 629 (1957).
91 Supra note 23.92 Diederich v. Ware, supra note 28; Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, supra
note 27.
